UAS OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES
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RADIO RECON GROUP | 28 OCTOBER 2026
Subject: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) employed by Colombia's National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC dissident organizations, and Venezuela's anti-Maduro insurgent movement commonly referred to as the Soldiers in Flannel Shirts.
Assessment focus: Drone types, documented and reported roles, jungle and mountainous operating environments, organizational differences, and implications for UAS threat recognition and defensive planning.
Executive assessment
The proliferation of inexpensive commercial drones has significantly changed the security environment in northern South America. Armed organizations that historically relied on human observers, couriers, and ground reconnaissance increasingly have access to aerial observation technology.
Three distinct cases warrant examination:
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ELN: An established Colombian guerrilla organization with a presence in remote borderlands and difficult mountainous and jungle terrain.
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FARC dissidents: Fragmented armed organizations that emerged or continued after the 2016 peace agreement, some of which have incorporated commercially available drones into surveillance and explosive attacks.
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Soldiers in Flannel Shirts: A Venezuelan anti-government movement associated with former police officer Óscar Pérez, whose highly publicized 2017 helicopter action demonstrates the political and psychological impact of aircraft, but should not be mistaken for evidence of a developed small-UAS program.
The principal analytical distinction is between documented drone employment, plausible capabilities, and unverified claims. Commercial drone availability alone does not establish that a particular organization possesses a coordinated UAS capability.
This guide examines these organizations as case studies in the changing UAS environment, with emphasis on defensive awareness rather than instructions for conducting insurgent operations.
1. UAS employment by organization
ELN — Ejército de Liberación Nacional
The ELN operates in a diverse geographic environment that includes the Colombian-Venezuelan border, the Catatumbo region, and portions of the eastern Colombian Andes.
Its UAS activity is associated with surveillance, territorial control, and attacks against Colombian security forces. Colombian reporting in March 2026 identified an ELN attack on the San Jorge military installation involving a fiber-optic-guided drone, illustrating the appearance of more sophisticated systems in the conflict.
Observed or reported roles: Aerial reconnaissance, observation of security-force activity, monitoring contested territory, and explosive attacks.
FARC dissident organizations
The original FARC organization signed a peace agreement in 2016. Subsequent armed dissident organizations, including factions associated with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), have developed increasingly visible UAS capabilities.
These organizations have employed drones for both intelligence collection and attacks. Colombian authorities documented numerous incidents during 2024–2026, particularly in Cauca and other contested rural departments.
Observed or reported roles: Surveillance, monitoring illicit economic activities, territorial control, and attacks on military and police installations.
Soldiers in Flannel Shirts — Venezuela
The Soldiers in Flannel Shirts (Soldados de Franela) were associated with Óscar Pérez, a former Venezuelan police officer who opposed the Maduro government.
On June 27, 2017, Pérez piloted a stolen police helicopter over Caracas during an anti-government action. Venezuelan authorities alleged that grenades were dropped near government buildings. Pérez and several associates were subsequently killed during a security operation in January 2018.
Important distinction: The 2017 incident involved a crewed helicopter, not an unmanned aircraft. Credible open-source reporting does not establish a comparable UAS program operated by Pérez's organization.
The case is therefore useful for examining the symbolic and psychological effects of aerial activity, but not as proof of Venezuelan opposition drone tactics.
2. Drone types and intended roles
DJI Mavic 3 family: Commercial camera quadcopter
Reported among commercially sourced drones used by Colombian armed groups. Its camera capabilities make it suitable for aerial observation; modified examples have also been implicated in explosive attacks. Exact model attribution varies by incident.
DJI Mini 4 Pro: Lightweight commercial quadcopter
Named in Colombian reporting on armed-group drone inventories. Primarily designed for photography and observation, with reports of unauthorized modification for hostile purposes.
Enterprise and inspection aircraft
Larger commercial inspection drones have been reported in the Colombian conflict. Their intended roles in civilian service include infrastructure inspection, mapping, and surveying. Armed groups have reportedly repurposed some industrial-class systems, although specific model identification is often uncertain.
Increasingly reported in Colombia, including fiber-optic-guided variants. These aircraft represent a different threat category from conventional camera drones because their navigation and communication arrangements may differ significantly.
Role comparison
|
UAS role |
ELN |
FARC dissidents |
Soldiers in Flannel Shirts |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Aerial reconnaissance |
Reported |
Reported |
Not established |
|
Territorial surveillance |
Reported |
Reported |
Not established |
|
Monitoring illicit economic activity |
Reported regionally |
Reported |
Not established |
|
Explosive-carrying drones |
Documented |
Documented |
Not established |
|
FPV aircraft |
Reported |
Reported |
Not established |
|
Crewed aircraft for political demonstration |
Not central to this assessment |
Not central |
Documented, 2017 |
3. Jungle terrain: environmental challenges
Dense tropical forest presents some of the most difficult conditions for aerial observation in Latin America. The problem is not simply the density of vegetation, but the combination of obstructed visibility, high humidity, frequent rainfall, limited access, and inconsistent communications.
Forest canopy and restricted observation
In mature tropical rainforest, overlapping layers of vegetation can conceal nearly everything at ground level. A camera looking directly downward may show little more than treetops, even when people, vehicles, or structures are present underneath.
This imposes several limitations on UAS observation:
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Visual obscuration: Dense canopy prevents reliable identification of activity beneath the trees.
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Thermal obscuration: Thermal cameras measure emitted radiation from visible surfaces; they generally cannot see people through dense foliage.
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Weather: Heavy rain, low clouds, and moisture can reduce image quality and compromise aircraft reliability.
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Navigation: Satellite positioning and compass performance may become inconsistent in obstructed environments.
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Recovery: A malfunctioning aircraft may be extremely difficult to locate or retrieve from inaccessible vegetation.
These challenges are especially relevant in Colombia's Chocó, Putumayo, and Amazonian regions, where dense forest and limited transportation infrastructure complicate both aerial and ground activities.
Humidity and precipitation
Tropical humidity is a persistent concern for commercial electronic systems. Condensation, moisture intrusion, and corrosion can affect cameras, connectors, batteries, and aircraft electronics.
Sudden tropical downpours also create unpredictable flying conditions. Many consumer drones are not designed for sustained flight in heavy precipitation.
The broader lesson is that advertised aircraft specifications are not necessarily representative of performance under prolonged tropical field conditions.
Rivers and isolated settlements
Rivers often serve as transportation routes through otherwise inaccessible rainforest. For civilian security and humanitarian monitoring, aerial imagery can provide useful information about flooding, river conditions, and the accessibility of isolated settlements.
However, observations of people or watercraft should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of armed-group activity. Civilian movement, fishing, agricultural work, and legitimate commerce are common throughout these regions.
4. Mountain terrain: environmental challenges
Colombia's Andes and the mountainous regions along the Venezuelan border introduce a different set of challenges.
Elevation and aircraft performance
At higher elevations, reduced air density can affect rotor efficiency, available lift, and aircraft handling. Performance margins may decline further when temperatures, payload weight, or battery condition are unfavorable.
A commercial drone that operates normally near sea level may perform differently at high elevation. Manufacturer operating limits therefore remain important.
Terrain masking and communication limitations
Mountain ridgelines, steep valleys, and rock formations can obstruct radio communications. This phenomenon, commonly called terrain masking, affects both manned and unmanned systems.
Its practical implications for defensive monitoring include the possibility that an aircraft may be visible to an observer while its control or telemetry emissions are difficult for a particular ground receiver to detect.
Consequently, an absence of RF detection does not conclusively establish that the airspace is clear.
Wind, cloud, and visibility
Mountain weather can change rapidly. Strong winds, turbulence, cloud banks, and reduced visibility are recurring hazards.
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Environmental factor |
Jungle |
Mountains |
|---|---|---|
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Visual observation |
Obstructed by canopy |
Obstructed by ridges and cloud |
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Thermal observation |
Limited by vegetation |
Limited by terrain and atmospheric conditions |
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Radio propagation |
Affected by vegetation and terrain |
Strongly affected by terrain obstruction |
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Weather |
Humidity, rain, thunderstorms |
Wind, turbulence, fog, rapid changes |
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Aircraft performance |
Moisture and recovery difficulties |
Elevation and wind constraints |
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Ground access |
Often restricted |
Often restricted by steep terrain |
5. The evolution of armed-group drone capabilities
The Colombian experience illustrates a broader transition from commercially available aerial cameras to more diverse and potentially dangerous unmanned systems.
Phase 1 — Commercial aerial observation
Small consumer aircraft provide an inexpensive way to obtain overhead imagery. Their accessibility lowers the financial barriers to aerial surveillance.
Phase 2 — Persistent territorial monitoring
Armed groups increasingly use aerial observation to monitor contested areas, illicit infrastructure, and the presence of rival organizations.
Phase 3 — Weaponized commercial aircraft
Colombian authorities have documented commercial drones modified to carry explosives. This introduces an aerial threat to communities, police facilities, and military installations.
Phase 4 — Diversification of guidance technology
Reporting in 2026 identifies FPV and fiber-optic-guided aircraft among the systems encountered in Colombia. This complicates the assumption that every hostile drone can be identified or interrupted through conventional RF monitoring alone.
This progression is a general analytical framework, not a claim that every ELN or FARC dissident unit passed through identical stages.
The scale of the problem is significant. Colombia reported 264 drone attacks during 2024–2025, with 15 soldiers killed and 153 injured, according to Reuters. In January 2026, the Colombian government announced a major national counter-drone defense initiative.
ACLED also reports substantial expansion of weaponized drone incidents across Latin America through August 2026, with Colombia accounting for a particularly large share.
6. Implications for defensive UAS awareness
For military security personnel, emergency responders, and organizations working in remote regions, these case studies emphasize the importance of combining multiple forms of observation.
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Defensive capability |
Primary purpose |
Important limitation |
|---|---|---|
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Visual observers |
Recognize and report aircraft |
Canopy, darkness, and terrain reduce visibility |
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Passive RF monitoring |
Detect some drone-related transmissions |
Does not identify every aircraft or guidance system |
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Acoustic monitoring |
Provide additional evidence of aircraft activity |
Wind, rain, wildlife, and machinery create interference |
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Radar and specialist sensors |
Support airspace awareness |
Performance depends on equipment and environmental conditions |
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Incident reporting |
Build a record of observations |
Requires accurate, consistent information |
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Protective infrastructure |
Reduce exposure to aerial hazards |
Must be assessed for local conditions and applicable safety standards |
Defensive response principles
When an unidentified drone is observed near a protected facility, civilian settlement, or humanitarian operation, the priority should be protecting people and preserving accurate information.
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Recognize: Establish whether an aerial object is present without assuming its operator or purpose.
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Correlate: Compare visual, acoustic, and available sensor observations.
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Report: Notify the responsible airspace, security, or emergency authority.
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Protect: Follow established sheltering, evacuation, and protective procedures appropriate to the threat.
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Document: Record the incident and preserve relevant evidence without handling suspicious debris or objects.
Personnel should not approach a crashed or abandoned drone suspected of carrying explosives. Such incidents require qualified explosive-ordnance personnel.
7. Lessons from the Venezuelan case
The Soldiers in Flannel Shirts case differs fundamentally from the Colombian examples.
Óscar Pérez's 2017 helicopter action demonstrated how an aerial incident could generate national and international attention, even without a sustained air capability. It also demonstrated the limits of relying on a highly visible aircraft operation as evidence of organizational strength.
For UAS threat analysis, the principal lessons are methodological.
First, aircraft type matters. A crewed helicopter operation does not establish the existence of a drone fleet.
Second, political messaging and military capability must be assessed separately. A spectacular aerial event may have considerable publicity value without demonstrating a repeatable operational capability.
Third, attribution requires corroboration. Videos, government statements, recovered equipment, and independent reporting should be evaluated together before assigning an aircraft or incident to a specific organization.
These distinctions are particularly important in Venezuela, where competing political narratives can make independent verification difficult.
8. Projected developments, 2026–2027
Analytical forecast — not confirmed future events
|
Development |
Assessment |
Confidence |
|---|---|---|
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Continued use of commercial multirotors by Colombian armed groups |
Likely |
High |
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Further proliferation of weaponized FPV aircraft |
Likely |
Moderate–high |
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Increased adoption of night-capable cameras |
Likely |
Moderate |
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Wider use of alternative guidance technologies |
Plausible |
Moderate |
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More sophisticated state counter-UAS programs |
Likely |
High |
|
Emergence of a distinct Soldiers in Flannel Shirts UAS capability |
Not established |
Low |
The most important forecast is that commercially derived UAS capabilities will continue to spread across different armed organizations, while local terrain and weather will remain significant constraints.
However, the technological capabilities of one Colombian faction should not be automatically attributed to another faction or to Venezuelan opposition groups.
9. Final assessment
The ELN and FARC dissident organizations provide substantial documented evidence of the adoption of commercial and modified UAS in irregular warfare. Their experience demonstrates how inexpensive aerial systems have become an important security concern across remote parts of Colombia.
Jungle and mountain environments complicate observation, communications, flight safety, and recovery. These conditions also create substantial uncertainty for anyone attempting to identify drone activity from the ground.
The Soldiers in Flannel Shirts movement offers a contrasting historical case: an aerial political action involving a crewed helicopter, rather than an independently verified unmanned-aircraft program.
For the Radio Recon Group, the principal conclusion is that effective defensive UAS awareness requires accurate aircraft identification, an understanding of environmental limitations, multiple complementary detection methods, and disciplined incident reporting.
Selected sources
RADIO RECON GROUP // LATIN AMERICAN UAS THREAT ASSESSMENT // OCT 2026