RUSSIAN MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS IN UKRAINE: EQUIPMENT, PROTOCOLS, AND BATTLEFIELD ADAPTATION

RADIO RECON GROUP // OCTOBER 2026

Introduction

The war in Ukraine has exposed both the strengths and weaknesses of Russian military communications. What began as an invasion supported by conventional military radio networks has evolved into a complex communications environment involving encrypted tactical radios, commercial handheld transceivers, satellite terminals, fiber-optic infrastructure, digital data networks, and improvised battlefield solutions.

Russian forces entered Ukraine with a mixture of modern and legacy communications equipment. Their inventory included the R-187P1 Azart digital tactical radio, R-168 Akveduk family of military radios, vehicle-mounted command systems, and older Soviet-era communications equipment.

However, equipment shortages, interoperability problems, electronic warfare, and battlefield losses forced Russian units to supplement military systems with inexpensive Chinese radios, civilian communications technologies, and commercially available networking equipment.

The resulting Russian communications architecture is not a single standardized network. It is a layered collection of systems whose capabilities vary considerably between formations.

Understanding these systems provides insight into the evolution of Russian command and control, the relationship between electronic warfare and communications, and the increasingly important role of commercial technology in modern warfare.

1. R-187P1 Azart: Russia's Modern Tactical Radio

The R-187P1 Azart represents one of Russia's principal efforts to modernize tactical communications. Developed as a software-defined radio (SDR), the Azart was intended to replace older analog systems with encrypted digital communications and improved resistance to electronic warfare.

The Azart was integrated into Russia's Ratnik soldier modernization program and issued to selected infantry, airborne, and other formations.

Published characteristics:

• Frequency coverage: approximately 27–520 MHz.

• Digital voice and data communications.

• Integrated encryption capabilities.

• Frequency-agile operation, including frequency-hopping capabilities.

• Satellite navigation support using GLONASS/GPS.

• Relay and networking functions, depending on configuration.

Unlike a conventional analog handheld, the Azart can support different waveforms through software. This flexibility theoretically allows it to operate across different military communications environments.

However, its deployment in Ukraine revealed significant problems. The principal issue was not simply radio performance but interoperability. Units equipped with Azart radios sometimes operated alongside formations using older R-168 equipment or commercial radios that could not communicate using the same protected waveforms.

The result was a communications system in which modern encrypted networks existed alongside unencrypted or less-protected voice channels. An additional problem involved battlefield attrition. Radios lost or destroyed during the fighting could not always be replaced quickly enough to maintain uniform equipment distribution. A 2025 U.S. Army study documented both interoperability difficulties and substantial reported Azart losses during earlier phases of the war. 

2. R-168 Akveduk: The Backbone of Legacy Military Communications

The R-168 Akveduk family is another important component of Russian military communications. Rather than a single radio, Akveduk refers to a family of tactical transceivers designed for different command levels and operating environments.

Variants include handheld, manpack, and vehicle-mounted equipment. The R-168-5KNE, for example, is an HF manpack radio covering approximately 1.5–30 MHz, according to the U.S. Army's equipment reference database. Other R-168 models operate in VHF and UHF bands and provide communications for maneuver units, vehicles, and command posts. 

The Akveduk family supports several important communications functions:

• Tactical voice communications.

• HF communications over extended distances.

• Data transmission on supported variants.

• Protected communications where compatible equipment and cryptographic configurations are available.

• Connections between mobile command posts and subordinate units.

HF remains relevant because it can support communications beyond the practical range of ordinary VHF handheld radios, particularly when terrestrial infrastructure is unavailable. However, HF propagation depends on frequency, time, ionospheric conditions, and antenna configuration. It is not a universal substitute for reliable local tactical networks. Russian reliance on multiple generations of radio equipment has created continuing compatibility challenges.

3. Commercial Radios: Baofeng, Lira, Kirisun, and Motorola-Type Equipment

Perhaps the most recognizable feature of Russian tactical communications in Ukraine has been the widespread use of inexpensive commercial handheld radios. Russian soldiers have employed Baofeng transceivers, Lira radios, Kirisun digital equipment, and other commercially available models. These radios are inexpensive, easily replaced, and relatively simple to operate. They also offer a practical way to equip large numbers of mobilized personnel when military radio supplies are insufficient.

The 2025 U.S. Army How Russia Fights report described extensive use of commercial analog and Digital Mobile Radio (DMR) equipment, with some estimates identifying more than 60 different commercial radio platforms across Russian formations. 

The use of commercial radios creates several technical distinctions.

Commercial equipment is not automatically insecure. Some DMR radios support modern encryption, while others provide only basic privacy features or none at all. Similarly, digital modulation does not necessarily mean that the transmission is encrypted. The distinction is important: a digital radio may prevent an ordinary analog receiver from reproducing intelligible audio, but that alone does not provide cryptographic protection.

4. Digital Communications Protocols

Russian communications in Ukraine involve several different technologies, which should not be confused with one another.

Analog FM

Conventional frequency-modulated voice remains common among inexpensive commercial radios and older military equipment. Its advantages include low cost, simplicity, and widespread hardware compatibility. Its disadvantages include limited data capacity and the absence of inherent encryption.

DMR — Digital Mobile Radio

DMR is a standardized digital voice and data technology widely used in commercial radio systems. Common DMR Tier II implementations use two-slot TDMA, allowing two logical voice or data channels to share a 12.5 kHz radio channel. DMR supports features such as individual calls, group calls, radio identification, and limited data messaging. Encryption availability depends on the particular radio, firmware, and configuration.

Russian use of DMR reflects a broader reliance on commercial technology rather than a uniquely Russian military protocol.

TETRA — Terrestrial Trunked Radio

TETRA is another digital communications standard, commonly associated with professional, public-safety, and government networks.

In March 2022, an open-source video appeared to show an Azart radio operating with a TETRA waveform. This suggested that some Russian equipment might support a standardized communications mode in addition to proprietary military waveforms.

However, the extent of operational TETRA deployment in Ukraine remains uncertain. A demonstration of waveform compatibility does not establish that TETRA became a standard Russian battlefield network. 

Proprietary military waveforms

Russian military radios also use manufacturer-specific digital waveforms designed for protected tactical communications. Public documentation does not fully establish the waveform implementations, cryptographic configurations, or interoperability characteristics of all deployed Russian systems. Consequently, it would be inaccurate to describe Russian tactical communications as universally using DMR, TETRA, or any other single standardized protocol.

5. HF Radio and Long-Range Communications

Despite investment in modern digital communications, Russian forces continue to use HF radio for some long-distance communications requirements. HF offers a capability fundamentally different from line-of-sight VHF/UHF communications. Signals can propagate through interactions with the ionosphere, allowing communication beyond the immediate radio horizon without requiring a chain of terrestrial repeaters. Early in the invasion, analysts documented Russian reliance on unencrypted HF communications and mobile phones when more suitable communications systems were unavailable. 

HF communications can support several general operating methods:

• Voice: Direct operator-to-operator communications.

• Digital data: Low-bandwidth messages using compatible modems and waveforms.

• Skywave: Ionospheric propagation over extended distances.

• NVIS: Near-vertical incidence skywave propagation, which can provide regional coverage under suitable conditions.

Specific digital HF modes used by individual Russian formations are not consistently documented in reliable public reporting. Civilian modes such as FT8 should not be assumed to be standard Russian military protocols without evidence.

The broader lesson is that HF remains a useful independent communications capability, particularly when terrestrial networks are damaged or unavailable.

6. Satellite Communications and the Starlink Problem

Satellite connectivity has become central to battlefield command and control because it enables transmission of information far beyond the capabilities of ordinary voice radios. Russian forces have used domestic satellite systems, commercial satellite services, and unauthorized Starlink terminals obtained through third parties.

Starlink became especially valuable because it offered relatively high-bandwidth internet access that could support video transmission, messaging, and battlefield data sharing. However, in February 2026, SpaceX and Ukrainian authorities implemented measures to restrict unauthorized Russian Starlink access in Ukraine, including registration controls. These restrictions highlighted the danger of depending on infrastructure controlled by an outside commercial provider. 

Russian alternatives include domestic satellite services and terrestrial networks, but they do not necessarily offer the same combination of portability, capacity, and latency. The Russian Gonets satellite system, for example, has historically been better suited to relatively limited messaging applications than high-bandwidth video distribution. Satellite communications therefore remain an area in which Russia's military has had to combine dedicated equipment with commercially sourced alternatives.

7. Fiber-Optic Cables, Wi-Fi, and Local Data Networks

One of the more significant developments in Russian battlefield communications has been the increased importance of fixed infrastructure.

Although military communications are often associated with radios, Russian units have also employed fiber-optic cable, wired connections, commercial Wi-Fi equipment, and localized data networks. These systems can support data-intensive applications without relying entirely on tactical radio bandwidth.

They also present different engineering tradeoffs.

Recent analysis of Russian tactical communications identifies commercial Wi-Fi hardware, private LTE, wired networks, and LoRa-based messaging as elements of a fragmented communications environment. The same research highlights a persistent difficulty: Russian tactical military radios generally have not provided enough consistent data throughput to support widespread, integrated video-heavy battlefield networks.  This is especially consequential as reconnaissance drones and digital command systems generate increasing amounts of information.

8. Telegram and Civilian Applications in Command and Control

One of the most revealing developments in the war has been the Russian military's dependence on civilian software. Telegram became widely used for sharing information among soldiers, commanders, drone operators, and support organizations. Reports have described its use for passing reconnaissance information, coordinating activities, sharing drone footage, and distributing battlefield updates. This adoption was driven in part by the shortcomings of Russia's own integrated command systems.

The Sozvezdie-M2 program was intended to link reconnaissance, command posts, artillery, and maneuver units through a unified digital architecture. However, its implementation has been troubled, leaving units to adopt commercial alternatives.

Restrictions affecting Telegram in Russia during February 2026 created additional difficulties for military users who had incorporated the platform into everyday communications.  Telegram is not itself a military program. Internet-based application that operates over underlying data connections such as cellular networks, satellite internet, or wired infrastructure. This distinction illustrates the increasingly layered nature of military communications: the physical transmission network, data network, and application may all come from different providers.

9. Electronic Warfare and Communications Security

Electronic warfare has shaped communications practices on both sides of the conflict. Radio systems operating in a contested electromagnetic environment must contend with interference, intentional jamming, and the possibility that transmissions may be detected or analyzed. Russian modernization programs emphasized protected digital communications and frequency agility, but the widespread use of commercial equipment has complicated the establishment of uniform communications security.

Three distinct concepts are important:

TRANSEC — Transmission Security

Measures intended to protect the transmission itself, including certain frequency-agile and spread-spectrum techniques.

COMSEC — Communications Security

Measures intended to protect the information communicated, including cryptographic protections and key management.

EMCON — Emissions Control

The management of electromagnetic emissions to reduce unnecessary transmissions and associated exposure.

A radio may provide strong encryption while still emitting a detectable RF signal. Likewise, a frequency-agile radio is not necessarily immune to interference or detection. The Russian experience demonstrates that effective communications security depends on equipment, network architecture, training, and disciplined implementation rather than encryption alone.

10. Evolution of Russian Communications, 2022–2026

This timeline describes publicly reported developments rather than a uniform progression across every Russian formation.

11. Equipment and Protocol Reference

These are representative systems, not an exhaustive inventory. Equipment presence and usage vary by unit, period, and location.

12. Assessment: Lessons from Russian Communications in Ukraine

Russia's communications experience offers several important conclusions about modern military command and control.

First, expensive military communications equipment does not guarantee effective communications. Compatibility between equipment generations, operator training, supply chains, and network management are equally important.

Second, commercial technology has become indispensable to contemporary military operations. Inexpensive radios, Wi-Fi infrastructure, satellite terminals, and messaging applications have filled gaps that traditional military procurement programs failed to address.

Third, voice communications and modern battlefield data requirements are fundamentally different. A network sufficient for passing short voice messages may be inadequate for transmitting multiple reconnaissance video streams or maintaining a shared digital operational picture.

Fourth, electronic warfare has reinforced the value of communications diversity. Russian forces have continued using combinations of military radios, commercial equipment, satellite connectivity, and fixed-line infrastructure rather than relying exclusively on one transmission method.

Finally, dependence on civilian technology introduces its own vulnerabilities. Access restrictions, software policy changes, incompatible hardware, and commercial service interruptions can affect military communications just as surely as battlefield equipment losses.

Conclusion

The Russian military communications environment in Ukraine is best understood as a hybrid system combining modern military SDRs, legacy HF and VHF equipment, inexpensive commercial radios, satellite services, and improvised digital networks.

The Azart and Akveduk families remain important components of Russian military communications, but neither has eliminated the need for commercial alternatives.

The widespread adoption of DMR equipment, internet-based messaging, Wi-Fi infrastructure, and satellite connectivity demonstrates how modern warfare is pushing military communications beyond traditional voice radio networks.

The most significant lesson is that communications effectiveness is determined not by any single radio or protocol, but by the ability to connect personnel, sensors, command systems, and information services into a reliable network under difficult conditions.

Russia has demonstrated considerable improvisation in addressing its communications deficiencies, but public reporting through October 2026 continues to indicate problems with interoperability, secure data integration, and dependence on commercial infrastructure.

Principal references

• RUSI — Russian Comms in Ukraine: A World of Hertz

• U.S. Army — How Russia Fights (2025)

• Armada International — Talking the Talk

• Carnegie — How Will the Loss of Starlink and Telegram Impact Russia's Military?

• Calibre Defence — Russian C4ISR and Tactical Communications

RADIO RECON GROUP // OPEN-SOURCE TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT // 29 OCTOBER 2026